Abstract

In my chapter, I explore from a historical perspective the Neo-Confucian understanding of wrongdoing and ethically inappropriate behavior needing correction. I follow Kwong-loi Shun (Resentment and Forgiveness in Confucian Thought. Journal of East-West Thought (4): 13–35, 2014, 15) in assuming that the virtue of forgiveness is “not developed nor idealized” in traditional Confucian thinking. Like Confucius (551–479) and other early Confucian thinkers, Neo-Confucians like Cheng Yi (1033–1107) and Zhu Xi (1130–1200) wanted the ethical agent to demonstrate mercy, pardon, leniency, and compassion, but not forgiveness (in our modern sense). The main reason for the absence of such virtue is that Neo-Confucians, like their Confucian precursors, did not believe that the sage (i.e., Confucius) could injure or be injured by others; consequently, he would not need to forgive them either. Since everybody is required to emulate the sage, there is therefore no reason to develop the virtue of forgiveness. Nevertheless, Neo-Confucian have developed sophisticated accounts of how to respond to wrongful treatment in an ethical way; and these accounts have deeply influenced many societies in East Asia. I conclude this chapter by drawing out some broader implications of my historical survey.