Abstract

We critically examine Vickers’ project of future-proof science, which aims to identify scientific facts based upon a solid international scientific consensus. Vickers claims that second-order evidence—specifically a 95% consensus among a diverse, international scientific community—provides a principled criterion for identifying future-proof science. We challenge both the motivation behind this project and Vickers’ account of scientific consensus. Our analysis raises concerns about the methodological validity of the 30 alleged examples of future-proof science, questioning the selection, isolation, and interpretation of such scientific claims. We argue that the dissimilarities among these examples expose potential flaws, such as lack of simplicity and semantic opacity, which undermine their effectiveness in supporting the project. Furthermore, we criticize the assumption that a solid international scientific consensus is a reliable indicator of future-proof science. Given that consensus in science is multifactorial, we contend that second-order evidence is insufficient to support any scientific claim as an instance of future-proof science. We also object that scientific consensus cannot be correlated to future-proof science, provided its mechanism is driven by social factors that are not necessarily aligned with the reliability required for claims about established scientific facts. Our analysis thus reveals that Vickers fails to tackle the so-called threshold problem afflicting his proposed criterion for future-proof science.