Abstract

It has been claimed that several of the rights in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights - in particular the social and economic rights to the provision of welfare in, for example, education - cannot literally be rights of everybody. We find two main lines of analysis that have been raised to back up this claim. One of these lines is theoretical or normative in nature. Here I take up Onora O’Neill’s concern with the counterpart obligations that attach to the UDHR social and economic rights. She argues that these obligations do not have a universal character and cannot backstop universal moral rights. I suggest ways around her argument. The other main line concerns feasibility. Here I take up the argument that the UDHR social and economic rights apparently cannot, under existing conditions, be fulfilled at even a minimal level for millions upon millions of people. James Nickel, well aware of this problem, argues that these rights nonetheless do not, on grounds of infeasibility, fail of universality. I try to counter his argument. But I add, in conclusion, that these pressing practical problems with the UDHR welfare rights could possibly be removed in time, with concentrated effort.