A Game Semantics for System P

Studia Logica 104 (6):1119-1144 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper we introduce a game semantics for System P, one of the most studied axiomatic systems for non-monotonic reasoning, conditional logic and belief revision. We prove soundness and completeness of the game semantics with respect to the rules of System P, and show that an inference is valid with respect to the game semantics if and only if it is valid with respect to the standard order semantics of System P. Combining these two results leads to a new completeness proof for System P with respect to its order semantics. Our approach allows us to construct for every inference either a concrete proof of the inference from the rules in System P or a countermodel in the order semantics. Our results rely on the notion of a witnessing set for an inference, whose existence is a concise, necessary and sufficient condition for validity of an inferences in System P. We also introduce an infinitary variant of System P and use the game semantics to show its completeness for the restricted class of well-founded orders.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,237

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-05-13

Downloads
54 (#418,521)

6 months
2 (#1,294,541)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Still Another Anti-Molinist Argument.Daniel Rubio - 2024 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 8 (2).

Add more citations

References found in this work

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.
Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.

View all 8 references / Add more references