What is the narrow content of fence (and other definitionally and interpretationally primitive concepts)?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3):138-138 (2011)
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Abstract

It's unclear what narrow content is interpersonally shared for concepts that don't originate from core cognition yet are still definitionally and interpretationally primitive. A primary concern is that for these concepts, one cannot draw a principled distinction between inferences that are content determining and those that aren't. The lack of a principled distinction imperils an account of interpersonally shared concepts

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Eric Mandelbaum
CUNY Graduate Center

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Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The origin of concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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