Abstract

The dominant traditions of ethical discourse in the West begin with the self. I argue in this dissertation that ethics must begin with the other. Using the writings of post-phenomenologists Emmanuel Levinas and Georges Bataille , as well as those of the American pragmatist, William James , I contend that ethics must begin with responsibility to the other, and the movements of excessive actions beyond current ethical codes and limits is a religious process whereby aesthetic energies are transformed when responsibility to the other is accepted. ;I begin with Friedrich Nietzsche's radical critique of rational Western morality and propose that a post-Nietzschean perspective is also suggestive for a re-figuring of an interpersonal ethic of the other. The current American discussion has questionably framed this concern for the other around the dilemma of incommensurability, and Alasdair MacIntyre's ethic is a prime example. However, I argue that MacIntyre's incommensurability indicates alleged hermeneutical problems coupled with an endorsement of parochial communities which leads to identity politics, rather than an authentic concern for the other ;Next, I argue that Levinas's emphasis on the absolute demand of the face of the other disputes the subordination of personal concern to rationalistic principles. Levinas's singularity, the irreducible uniqueness of the human other, is important for ethics because it calls into question ethical concepts that privilege self-interest. ;Then I show how Bataille, someone not known for his ethical contributions, and his "excess" and the transgression of limits and social taboos challenges radical incommensurability as well as a long standing Western ethical tradition: Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. Bataille, is significant in highlighting an "otherness" that cannot be reduced to thought, language, or philosophical system, as there always is an excess or remainder that the system cannot absorb, and which must be spent excessively for the common good. ;Finally, I argue how James's long neglected radical empiricism is significant in providing a social matrix of relationality, commensurability, and openness to otherness. James's excessive energies and "strenuous mood" are also important and previously overlooked contributions to ethics