Nietzsche, Freedom and Power

European Journal of Social Theory 6 (2):191-208 (2003)
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Abstract

In contradistinction to a common misconception of Nietzsche as a theoretician who only concerned himself with power, it is argued Nietzsche can be understood as a philosopher who conceived of power in relation to will, freedom, cause and effect, and responsibility. His conception of freedom poses a challenge to mainstream liberal and juridico-rights based political philosophies; it arguably also challenges some of the claims propounded by today's foremost critical theorist, Jürgen Habermas. What is overlooked, due to an unduly deconstructive restriction, is the saliency of freedom in Nietzsche's thought which, moreover, is linked to an abiding interest in responsibility - a point overlooked by Foucault, Habermas and critics of Nietzsche.

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