La intencionalidad como impulso formador: Notas para Una lectura fenomenológica Del origen conjunto Del organismo Y su mundo circundante

Universitas Philosophica 37 (75):45-72 (2020)
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Abstract

This essay aims to show that a phenomenological account of animal behavior can shed light on an ethological approach to alterity, and vice versa. The interface between ethology and phenomenology–which, as it is argued, is intelligible only with reference to a shared dimension of affection–is framed by means of the phenomenological concept of intentionality, which appears as a generative force of the organism, its behavior and surrounding world. This means that intentionality does not shape stable structures, but plastic and dynamic processes that bound both the genesis of an organism and its surrounding world. Formation is thus understood as an epigenetic development, which suggests that natural forms are the result of a movement that goes from the general to the particular, from the most broad and regular structures of experience, to the multifarious proliferation of perspectives.

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Matter, Life and Generation: Eighteenth-Century Embryology and the Haller-Wolff Debate.Shirley A. Roe - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (1):94-99.

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