Does climate change justify a global epistocracy?

Abstract

In this paper, I will argue that given a choice between a global epistocracy and a global democracy, we ought to choose epistocracy. The reason for this is the need for stopping the ongoing climatic change that will cause a massive amount of suffering and death. Accordingly, I will demonstrate why the democratic process is inadequate in preventing the future climate disaster, and why an epistocracy have a better chance to succeed in this endeavour. My argumentation relies on four steps. First, I shall start with some initial housekeeping that explains why the outcome of continuing climate change is so repugnant. Secondly, I will demonstrate why implementing policies that halt climate change is something we ought to do and why it takes priority over other political concerns. Thirdly, I will argue that given psychological barriers coupled with the Condorcet Jury Theorem we have reason to believe a global democracy will fail to implement these necessary policies. Finally, I shall defend some fundamental claims that the epistocratic method relies on. This I do for two reasons: first, to give some moral credence to the epistocratic method and as a consequent close the door to radical authoritarianism. I do this because even if our priority is to prevent the impending climate disaster, we need to safeguard against a decision-making process that possibly could enact morally repugnant policies, e.g., bestow only one person with all political power. Secondly, the defence of epistocracy will demonstrate why a proceduralist argumentation for democracy does not yield a great moral advantage vis-à-vis the epistocratic method.

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Samuel Malm
Umeå University

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References found in this work

Democracy and Disobedience.Peter Singer - 1974 - Philosophy 49 (188):215-216.
Authority.Thomas Christiano - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Democracy.Tom Christiano - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Children and democracy: Theory and policy.Francis Schrag - 2004 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (3):365-379.

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