Nominalism and the main theses of "Prince" by Niccolò Machiavelli

Folia Philosophica 26:365--373 (2008)
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Abstract

In general, the fundamental problem for the philosophy of politics is taking a stand in the argument: man as an individual and community. Apriorically, this assumption is the basis for the whole thought construction of all points of view in the philosophy of politics. The author of the article makes an attempt to prove that Machiavelli, representing a nominalistic standpoint, gives the basis for the underpinnings of the philosophy of liberalism. The author of "Prince" “deprives the world of its illusions”. His method of perceiving the world consists in the synthesis of sensual impressions and search for the confirmation of these syntheses in the interpretation of historical events. "Prince" is based on this method. It constitutes a type of a catechism of behaviours by means of which we can achieve success in ruling out and, thus, virtu is more important than a fortune. If an individual obeys the rules from "Prince" and rules, achieves success, but this success is at the same time the peace for the mass. It does not matter if the "Prince" rules out well. What matters is the plebs’ conviction that the "Prince" rules out well and does not rebel making any revolts. The evil is sometimes blissful and lead to the good. That is what the world is, was, and will be about. It is honest in this strange sense of the word.

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