Semantic Epistemology: A Brief Response to Devitt

Theoria 27 (2):223-227 (2012)
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Abstract

In this article, I argue that philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s and that intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference.

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Edouard Machery
University of Pittsburgh