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Pareto improvements by Pareto strategic voting under majority voting with risk loving and risk avoiding voters — A note
Theory and Decision 39 (2):207-211 (1995)
Abstract
Voters satisfy maximin or maximax in their choices between sets of alternatives and secure a Pareto improvement by all voting strategically under simple majority voting for particular sincere preferences. Thus the assumption that strategic voting is a bad thing is challenged and the idea that we should reject voting because of the possibility of misrepresentation dismissedOther Versions
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Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict.I. D. A. Macintyre - 1993 - Theory and Decision 35 (2):167-177.
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