A No-Trade Theorem under Knightian Uncertainty with General Preferences

Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):173-181 (2001)
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Abstract

This paper derives a no-trade theorem under Knightian uncertainty, which generalizes the theorem of Milgrom and Stokey by allowing general preference relations. It is shown that the no-trade theorem holds true as long as agents' preferences are dynamically consistent in the sense of Machina and Schmeidler, and satisfies the so-called piece-wise monotonicity axiom. A preference satisfying the piece-wise monotonicity axiom does not necessarily imply the additive utility representation, nor is necessarily based on beliefs.

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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.

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