Abstract

Alvin Plantinga claims that belief that God exists ought to be considered rationally acceptable, even when not justified on the basis of reasons, evidence, etc.: i.e., it is properly basic. This dissertation examines and evaluates that position. ;Chapter 1 is a study of three historical positions providing insight into the background of Plantinga's view: Classical Foundationalism , John Calvin's religious epistemology, and the common-sense philosophy of Thomas Reid. We discuss key concepts such as: the sensus divinitatus; notitia, fiducia, and assensus; and belief-dispositions and proper functioning. ;Chapter 2 deals with the way Plantinga sets the stage for his own position. First, we discuss the notion of the ethics of belief--normative standards for the rational acceptability of beliefs. Second, we consider the evidentialist objection to belief that God exists. Third, we examine Plantinga's characterization of Classical Foundationalism. ;Chapter 3 examines Plantinga's critique of Classical Foundationalism: it fails to account for the acceptability of beliefs about the existence of other persons and enduring physical objects, and memory experiences. Plantinga contends the criteria for rational acceptability ought to be expanded to include the proper basicality of such beliefs and the belief that God exists. Second, we consider the Reformed objection to natural theology and its relationship to these epistemological issues. Third, we discuss the difference between reasons or evidence and grounds for beliefs, specifically, grounds for belief that God exists. Fourth, we explore the notions of positive epistemic status and proper epistemic functioning. ;Chapter 4 examines some conceptual consequences of Plantinga's position. We begin by considering the relationship between faith and reason in Plantinga's position. Specifically, we look at the Great Pumpkin Objection, fideism, and the reasonableness of faith as Plantinga describes it. Next we examine the notions of belief defeaters, paradigm shift, and personal knowledge and the implications these have for the reasonableness of faith. Suggestions for expansion, improvement, and the classification of Plantinga's position follow. We conclude with an assessment of the significance of Plantinga's position, both for general epistemology, and for the epistemology of religion