Handedness, self-models and embodied cognitive content

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):529–538 (2008)
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Abstract

The paper presents and discusses the “which-is-which content of handedness,” the meaning of left as left and right as right, as a possible candidate for the idea of a genuine embodied cognitive content. After showing that the Ozma barrier, the non-transferability of the meaning of left and right, provides a kind of proof of the non-descriptive, indexical nature of the which-is-which content of handedness, arguments are presented which suggest that the classical representationalist account of cognition faces a perplexing problem of underdetermination of reference of left and right in the which-is-which sense. By way of contrast, no such problems occur in a framework were embodied contents are not mediated by some extra body model which carries the representational power, but are instead directly represented.

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Author's Profile

Holger Lyre
Otto von Guericke Universität, Magdeburg

Citations of this work

Kant on Spatial Orientation.Sven Bernecker - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):519-533.

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References found in this work

The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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