Permanent Contributions in Philosophy

Metaphilosophy 50 (3):199-211 (2019)
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Abstract

Has any school or movement in all of Western philosophy made a permanent contribution, permanent in the sense that it will last as long as philosophy does? More narrowly, has there ever been put forward a thesis that has achieved lasting consensus? After carefully defining “philosophical thesis” and “consensus,” so as to forestall uninteresting answers, this paper argues that the ancient Greeks made one or two such contributions, and the Analytic philosophers (ca. 1890–1960) made a few, but there have been no others. Moreover (a) the Analytic contributions were more empirical than philosophical, and (b) they were almost entirely negative. So, the basic short answer to our question is “no.” The paper concludes by asking in what way(s) there has been progress in philosophy.

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William G. Lycan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Précis of On evidence in philosophy.William G. Lycan - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (5):569-572.
On the Uses of Philosophy.William G. Lycan - 2024 - Philosophia 52 (3):547-557.

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References found in this work

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Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Relevance.D. Sperber & Deirdre Wilson - 1986 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 2.
What good are counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.
The Causal Theory of Perception.H. P. Grice & Alan R. White - 1961 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35 (1):121-168.

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