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Enactive intentionality
Abstract
Though Noë is concerned to emphasize that perceptual experiences are not per se internal representations, he does not really say why, and he is fairly quiet about what he takes intentionality and representation themselves to be. Drawing on a subsequent paper (Noë (forthcoming)), I bring out and criticize his in fact radically negative view of those fundamental mental capacitiesAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Olfactory imagery: is exactly what it smells like.Benjamin D. Young - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3303-3327.
Disappearing Appearances: On the Enactive Approach to Spatial Perceptual Content.René Jagnow - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):45-67.
A vehicular theory of corporeal qualia (a gift to computationalists).Jonathan Waskan - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):103-125.
References found in this work
Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
What Computers Still Can’T Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 1992 - MIT Press.
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