The skeptics—introductory essay by (back to homepage)

Abstract

‘Skepticism’ refers primarily to two positions. Knowledge skepticism says there is no such thing as knowledge, and justification skepticism denies the existence of justified belief. How closely the two views are related depends on the relationship between knowledge and justification: if knowledge entails justified belief, as many theorists say, then justification skepticism entails knowledge skepticism (but not vice versa). Either form of skepticism can be limited in scope. Global (or radical) skepticism challenges the epistemic credentials of all beliefs, saying that no one knows anything, or no belief is justified. More local skepticism is restricted to some domain; thus some skeptics question the epistemic credentials of beliefs about other minds (but not beliefs about one’s own mind), or beliefs concerning empirical matters (but not concerning a priori matters).

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,302

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Externalism, Skepticism, and Skeptical Dogmatism.Mark Walker - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (1):27-57.
Disagreement, Skepticism, and the Dialectical Conception of Justification.Markus Lammenranta - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):3-17.
Skepticism Avoided.Patrick Hawley - 2003 - Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Fallibilism.Stephen Hetherington - 2005 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Achieving epistemic descent.Brett Andrew Coppenger - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Iowa
Moral skepticism.David Copp - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (3):203 - 233.
Meta‐Skepticism.Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):541-565.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
43 (#543,787)

6 months
43 (#107,387)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Steven Luper
Trinity University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references