The Information Liar Paradox: A Problem for Floridi’s RSDI Definition

Philosophy and Technology 28 (2):323-327 (2015)
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Abstract

In this commentary, I discuss the effects of the liar paradox on Floridi’s definition on semantic information. In particular, I show that there is at least one sentence that creates a contradictory result for Floridi’s definition of semantic information that does not affect the standard definition

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Björn Lundgren
Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg

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Is semantic information meaningful data?Luciano Floridi - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):351-370.

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