Abstract

This paper tries to provide a complete list and classification of the motives for acting in accordance with morals, to explain the mechanisms underlying the less transparent among these motives, and to probe which of these motives are suited for justifying morals. After giving reasons for the importance of an empirical theory of moral motives for ethics, and after specifying the exact question of the present study a general model of moral action and a main classification of the motives for acting morally is presented. Self-transcendent motives, motives close to morals, like sympathy and respect, and moral motives in the narrow sense, which proceed from moral judgements, are scrutinized in detail. Only the motives near to morals and interest in cooperation but not the moral motives in the narrow sense are suited for justifying morals. A concluding sketch of the development of moral judgements shows that only motives near to morals and interest in cooperation are also the sources of autonomously developed moral criteria