What are Conditional Intentions?

Methode: Analytic Perspectives 4 (6):30-60 (2015)
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Abstract

The main thesis of this paper is that, whereas an intention simpliciter is a commitment to a plan of action, a conditional intention is a commitment to a contingency plan, a commitment about what to do upon (learning of) a certain contingency relevant to one’s interests obtaining. In unconditional intending, our commitment to acting is not contingent on finding out that some condition obtains. In conditional intending, we intend to undertake an action on some condition, impinging on our interests, which is as yet unsettled for us, but about which we can find out without undue cost.

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Kirk Ludwig
Indiana University, Bloomington

Citations of this work

Do corporations have minds of their own?Kirk Ludwig - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):265-297.
Proxy Agency in Collective Action.Kirk Ludwig - 2016 - In Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic, The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. New York: Routledge. pp. 58-67.
Plan B.Sarah K. Paul - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):550-564.

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References found in this work

Practical Reflection.David Velleman - 1989 - Princeton University Press.
How to Share an Intention.J. David Velleman - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):29-50.
A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts.John R. Searle - 1975 - In K. Gunderson, Language, Mind and Knowledge. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 344-369.
Proxy Agency in Collective Action.Kirk Ludwig - 2013 - Noûs 48 (1):75-105.
Shared agency and contralateral commitments.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2004 - Philosophical Review 113 (3):359-410.

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