Une défense hétérodoxe de la conception inférentialiste de l'introspection

Dialogue 44 (1):123-144 (2005)
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Abstract

The aim of this article is to defend the inferentialist conception ofqualiaintrospection against some apparently decisive objections. According to inferentialism, a self-attribution of a qualitative state is to be understood as the conclusion of an inference, rather than as issuing from an experience of a specific kind. It has been objected that formally correct inferences warranting introspective conclusions are simply not to be found. I concede this point, but maintain that inferentialism should not be abandoned. Some deductive inferences are correct because of the contents of the concepts which occur in them, rather than in virtue of their logical form. I claim that this is what happens for introspective inferences: they are materially correct because ofa prioriconceptual liaisons linking the concept of a conscious experience with a certain class of demonstrative concepts.

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Pascal Ludwig
Université Paris-Sorbonne

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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