The Argument for Subject‐Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):684-701 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Martine Nida-Rümelin has argued recently for subject-body dualism on the basis of reflections on the possibility of survival in fission cases from the literature on personal identity. The argument focuses on the claim that there is a factual difference between the claims that one or the other of two equally good continuers of a person in a fission case is identical with her. I consider three interpretations of the notion of a factual difference that the argument employs, and I argue that on each of them the argument either begs the question or is unsound.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity Defended.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):702-714.
Fission, First Person Thought, and Subject-body Dualism.Kirk Ludwig - 2017 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 13 (1):5-25.
Knowledge: The Qualia Argument.Frank Jackson - 2002 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Ed. Martine Nida-Rümelin 3.
An argument from transtemporal identity for subject-body dualism.Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2010 - In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer, The waning of materialism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Reply to Roache.Simon Langford - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):676-681.
Color science and spectrum inversion: A reply to Nida-Rumelin.Peter W. Ross - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):566-570.
Color science and spectrum inversion: Further thoughts.Peter W. Ross - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (4):575-6.
Martine Nida-Rumelin.What Mary Couldn'T. Know - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger, Conscious Experience. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh.

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-07-26

Downloads
638 (#44,294)

6 months
130 (#41,912)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Kirk Ludwig
Indiana University, Bloomington

Citations of this work

Fission, First Person Thought, and Subject-body Dualism.Kirk Ludwig - 2017 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 13 (1):5-25.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
The Emergent Self.William Hasker - 1999 - London: Cornell University Press.
The Evolution of the Soul.Richard Swinburne - 1986 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

View all 27 references / Add more references