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The explanatory stopgap
Philosophical Review 113 (3):303-57 (2004)
Abstract
Is there an explanatory gap between raw feels and raw material? Some philosophers argue, and many other people believe, that scientific explanations of conscious experience cannot be as satisfying as typical scientific explanations elsewhere, even in our wildest dreams. The underlying philosophical claims areAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Knowledge-how: A unified account.Berit Brogaard - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 136-160.
The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1161-1198.
What Acquaintance Teaches.Alex Grzankowski & Michael Tye - 2019 - In Jonathan Knowles & Thomas Raleigh (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 75–94.
Representational theories of consciousness.William G. Lycan - 2000 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
References found in this work
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.D. M. Armstrong - 1968 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Ted Honderich.
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