No Hope in the Dark: Problems for four-dimensionalism

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (3):31-47 (2019)
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Abstract

Whether or not it is coherent to place hope in a future life beyond the grave has become a central question in the larger debate about whether a materialist view of human persons can accommodate Christian belief. Hud Hudson defends a four-dimensional account of resurrection in order to avoid persistent difficulties experienced by three-dimensionalist animalism. I present two difficulties unique to Hudson’s view. The first problem of counterpart hope is a manifestation of a general weakness of four-dimensional views to accommodate adequately prudential concern about one’s future self. More significantly, the second problem of quasi hope demonstrates that even if a temporal parts view can accommodate the possibility of future resurrection it necessarily leaves human beings in the dark about their individual futures and thus incapable of hope. I conclude that whatever its merits in demonstrating the possibility of resurrection, four-dimensionalist materialism cannot accommodate veridical Christian hope.

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Jonathan J. Loose
School of Advanced Study, University of London

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References found in this work

Personal identity.Derek Parfit - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person.Hud Hudson - 2001 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Contingent identity.Allan Gibbard - 1975 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (2):187-222.
On being in the same place at the same time.David Wiggins - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (1):90-95.
What are we?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.

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