A proper de jure objection to the epistemic rationality of religious belief: TODD R. LONG

Religious Studies 46 (3):375-394 (2010)
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Abstract

I answer Alvin Plantinga's challenge to provide a ‘proper’ de jure objection to religious belief. What I call the ‘sophisticates’ evidential objection' concludes that sophisticated Christians lack epistemic justification for believing central Christian propositions. The SEO utilizes a theory of epistemic justification in the spirit of the evidentialism of Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. I defend philosophical interest in the SEO against objections from Reformed epistemology, by addressing Plantinga's criteria for a proper de jure objection, his anti-evidentialist arguments, and the relevance of ‘impulsional evidence’. I argue that no result from Plantinga-style Reformed epistemology precludes the reasons I offer in favour of giving the SEO its due philosophical attention.

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Todd R. Long
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo

Citations of this work

Recent Work in Reformed Epistemology.Andrew Moon - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):879-891.
Religious disagreements and epistemic rationality.David M. Holley - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):33-48.

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References found in this work

Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.
The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
Epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2003 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (2):429-429.

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