What Can the Naïve Realist Say about Total Hallucinations? Riding the New Relationalist Wave

In Ori Beck & Farid Masrour, The Relational View of Perception: New Philosophical Essays. Routledge (2025)
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Abstract

In this chapter we will explore new avenues for developing and defending Naïve Realism (also known as Relationalism), understood as a thesis about the phenomenal character of experience. The core claim of Naive Realism is that ‘what it’s like’ for a subject who enjoys a normal, successful perceptual experience of her surroundings consists in her being directly consciously aware of mind-independent entities in her external environment. It is widely agreed that the strongest challenge to Naïve Realism comes from the alleged possibility of total hallucinations, and the orthodox line of response has been to adopt Disjunctivism about perceptual experience. In this chapter, we will instead focus on an emerging alternative family of responses, which we’ll call ‘New Wave Relationalism’ (NWR). The core commitment of NWR is to reject the initial assumption that there can be total hallucinations that are both non-relational and subjectively indistinguishable from genuine perceptions. The primary aim for this chapter will be to explore and defend this broad NWR strategy for responding to the threat posed by hallucinations to Naïve Realism. We will argue that which specific version or species of NWR a Naïve Realist should adopt will depend on their background methodological and metaphysical commitments.

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Author Profiles

Heather Logue
University of Leeds
Thomas Raleigh
University of Luxembourg

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References found in this work

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne, Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
A Metaphysics for Freedom.Helen Steward - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion.William Fish - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.

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