- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Locke's Account of Personal Identity: Memory as Fallible Evidence
History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (1):39 - 56 (2007)
Abstract
This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)Author's Profile
Other Versions
No versions found
My notes
Similar books and articles
Memory, quasi-memory, and pseudo-quasi-memory.Christopher Buford - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):465 – 478.
The Evidence of Personal Identity.Richard Swinburne - 1986 - In The Evolution of the Soul. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Moral Dimension in Locke's Account of Persons and Personal Identity.Ruth Boeker - 2014 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (3):229-247.
Did Locke Defend the Memory Continuity Criterion of Personal Identity?Johan E. Gustafsson - 2010 - Locke Studies 10:113-129.
‘The Secrets of All Hearts’: Locke on Personal Identity.Galen Strawson - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:111-141.
Locke's psychology of personal identity.Raymond Martin - 2000 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (1):41-61.
Of Mr. Locke's account of our personal identity.Thomas Reid - 1975 - In John Perry (ed.), Personal Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 113--118.
Analytics
Added to PP
2011-05-29
Downloads
32 (#711,554)
6 months
6 (#879,768)
2011-05-29
Downloads
32 (#711,554)
6 months
6 (#879,768)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Shadow People: Relational Personhood, Extended Diachronic Personal Identity, and Our Moral Obligations Toward Fragile Persons.Bartlomiej Lenart - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Alberta
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-648784bb4d-82spv uwo