Learning from Learning from our Mistakes

In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig, Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, Epistemic Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 51-70 (2016)
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Abstract

What can we learn from cases of knowledge from falsehood? Critics of knowledge-first epistemology have argued that these cases provide us with good reason for rejecting the knowledge accounts of evidence, justification, and the norm of belief. I shall offer a limited defense of the knowledge-first approach to these matters. Knowledge from falsehood cases should undermine our confidence in like-from-like reasoning in epistemology. Just as we should be open to the idea that knowledge can come from non-knowledge, we should be open to the idea that justified beliefs can come from unjustified beliefs.

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Clayton Littlejohn
Australian Catholic University

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References found in this work

Justification and the Truth-Connection.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The metaphysics of mind.Anthony Kenny - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Structure of Emotions.Robert M. Gordon & Ronald De Sousa - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (9):493-504.
A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons.Jennifer Hornsby - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson, Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press.

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