Abstract

In this chapter, I argue that by eliminating the subjective dimension from moral deliberation, orthodox, theory-oriented approaches to animal ethics overlook the importance of self-examination in navigating the complexity of our moral life. This is accomplished by depicting agents as rational beings, other animals as abstract beings bearing morally relevant properties and moral thinking as limited to rational argumentation. Instead, by following David J. Velleman and authors influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Iris Murdoch, I discuss the importance of the subjective outlook on a moral situation. I argue that ordinary ways in which a subject perceives and describes other animals—for example, as ‘pets’, ‘patients’, ‘fellow creatures’, and so forth—are essential because they mirror how agents think of themselves. For instance, when subjects describe animals as ‘pets’, they implicitly conceive of themselves as ‘pet-owners’. I argue that as self-reflecting beings, we can engage in self-examination, which is the process of reflecting and recognising the relationships between how we look at other animals and how we portray ourselves.