Abstract

This dissertation argues that assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia are, in certain cases, almost always morally permissible, and prevention and prohibition of AS and VAE are almost always morally unjustified. Specifically, AS and VAE are morally permissible when: the person seeking death is competent and has no moral obligations to others the discharge of which would be rendered significantly more difficult by her death through AS or VAE, and the person requires assistance in dying because she is incapable of bringing about her own death effectively. ;This argument is predicated on an analysis of the implications of the principle of respect for autonomy. In preventing someone from receiving necessary assistance in dying, one is compelling that person to live. That person's autonomy has been eliminated as, on balance, she would prefer not to pursue any of the choices that remain open to her. She would prefer death to anything else, yet that is the critical choice that is foreclosed to her. ;Given the significant autonomy interests at stake, this dissertation also argues for the legalization of AS and VAE for certain classes of individuals. Recognizing that for purposes of efficient administration of the law there cannot be a precise match between those for whom AS and VAE would be legally available and those for whom it would be morally permissible, we contend that by legalizing AS and VAE for the terminally ill and the severely, incurably disabled the set of lawful candidates for AS or VAE will include few individuals for whom AS and VAE would be morally impermissible. Furthermore, the arguments commonly offered against legalization are unconvincing. Abuses, such as manipulation of the terminally ill, can be controlled, if not eliminated, by proper safeguards. Moreover, the self-correcting mechanisms of democracy make a tumble down the slippery slope into mass nonvoluntary or involuntary euthanasia highly improbable