On the regress problem of deciding how to decide

Synthese 191 (4):661-670 (2014)
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Abstract

Any decision is made in some way or another. Which way? (Have I worked out enough alternatives to choose from? Which decision rule to apply?) That is a higher-order decision problem, to be dealt with in some way or other. Which way? That is an even higher-order decision problem. There seems to be a regress of decision problems toward higher and higher orders. But in daily life we stop moving to higher-order decision problems—stop the regress—at some finite point. The regress problem of deciding how to decide is the problem of explaining what would make it rational to stop the regress. I will give a new solution in the present paper. The result suggests a new way of looking at standard Bayesian theory and the more recent theory of adaptive rationality.

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Hanti Lin
University of California, Davis

Citations of this work

Metanormative regress: an escape plan.Christian Tarsney - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5).
Moral priorities under risk.Chad Lee-Stronach - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):793-811.
Deliberation, Reasons, and Alternatives.Justin Snedegar - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):682-702.

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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.

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