Abstract

Hume's most famous metaphysical arguments rely essentially on a few basic principles. To date, little has been done to thoroughly explicate these principles, such as that conceivability implies possibility, that two things are distinct just in case they are separable in thought, that something is not demonstrable if its contrary is conceivable, and others. Furthermore, Hume's notions of absolute possibility and necessity, conceivability, separability, distinctness, implication, demonstration, and others have also gone without a thorough and accurate explication. ;In my dissertation I explicate and clarify all of Hume's modal notions, and the principles in which they are deployed. This helps to shed new light on some of Hume's well-known metaphysical arguments, such as those concerning the principle of induction and personal identity. This treatment is greatly enriched by interpretations of other early modern authors on these topics, which ensure an historically accurate reading of Hume, and provide insights that go beyond Hume. ;I then take this new found knowledge and use it to resolve various questions in Hume scholarship, both large and small. Thus, on the current issue of whether Hume was a causal realist and believed in secret powers, or whether he was instead sceptical on the question, my research reveals that in fact Hume thought and argued that no conceivable object has any secret powers. Also, I determine exactly what Hume means by his puzzling statement that there is but one kind of necessity