Are We Free to Break the Laws?

In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press (1982)
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original Lewis, David (1981) "Are we free to break the laws?". Theoria 47(3):113-21

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David K. Lewis
PhD: Harvard University; Last affiliation: Princeton University

Citations of this work

A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View.Stewart Cohen - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 98-117.
A compatibilist version of the theory of agent causation.Ned Markosian - 1999 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3):257-277.
Dispositional Abilities.Ann Whittle - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.

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