Can Mental Images Provide Evidence for What is Possible?

Anthropology and Philosophy 7 (1-2):108-119 (2006)
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Abstract

Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that sensory images – “mental pictures” or other sense-based images of various situations – provide the best evidence for what is possible. In this paper I identify the best argument for this conclusion, but contend that it shows that certain non-sensory representations provide good evidence for possibility as well. That is, though I endorse the claim that the sensory imagination can be a source of evidence for what is possible, I deny that it is the only source. I also sketch some consequences of this view for the thesis that sensations and perceptual experiences are identical to physical states

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Janet Levin
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Mental imagery.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 2001 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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