Bad Beliefs: Why They Happen to Good People

Oxford University Press (2021)
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Abstract

This book challenges the view that bad beliefs - beliefs that blatantly conflict with easily available evidence - can largely be explained by widespread irrationality, instead arguing that ordinary people are rational agents whose beliefs are the result of their rational response to the evidence they're presented with.

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Neil Levy
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Do your own research!Neil Levy - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-19.
Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moral Worth: You Can't Have it Both Ways.Nomy Arpaly - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
Genealogical Undermining for Conspiracy Theories.Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-23.

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