Abstract

Efforts at demarcating pseudoscience from science have in the last four decades been fueled by claims of a substantial extensional consensus. Most philosophers, as well as scientists, reportedly have a knack for recognizing pseudoscience, and they agree on what counts as cases of pseudoscience. It is also believed that this extensional consensus will facilitate an intensional consensus on the defining criteria of pseudoscience. The extensional consensus, however, is undocumented, as is the existence of an acute pseudoscience perceptiveness. In this paper, we survey PhD-holding philosophers to assess whether there is consensus on what are examples of paradigmatic pseudosciences. While we do record an initial agreement on examples that can be called “pseudoscientific”, we find no agreement that any of these are paradigmatic. Furthermore, philosophers with a PhD do not categorize pseudosciences markedly differently from respondents with lower or no degrees, suggesting that philosophers are no better at identifying pseudosciences than others. If these findings are correct, addressing the demarcation between science and nonscience via the pseudoscience – science divide will offer no clear advantage for solving the demarcation problem.