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Hard-heartedness and Libertarianism Again
Journal of Philosophical Research 42:319-323 (2017)
Abstract
In a recent article, I defended libertarian views of free will against Richard Double’s argument that such views are hard-hearted. In supporting my main argument against Double, I invoked what I call “the Puppetmaster” argument. Double has recently countered that this argument fails. In this essay, I provide a response to this negative assessment of the Puppetmaster argument.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Moral Responsibility and Intentional Action: Sehon on Freedom and Purpose.Michael Louis Corrado - 2017 - Criminal Justice Ethics 36 (2):246-264.
Review of John Lemos’ A Pragmatic Approach to Libertarian Free Will. [REVIEW]Richard Double - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (2):299-306.
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