Abstract

The concept of emotion is the subject of this dissertation. Philosophers in the modern era have developed two important analyses of emotion. The older view, expressed by thinkers such as William James, suggests that emotions are sorts of feelings. This view has been roundly criticized and rejected by most. The more modern view, expressed by thinkers such a Errol Bedford and Robert Solomon, suggests that emotions are a type of cognition. The criticisms which have been offered of this latter view tend to take a less severe form, finding fault within the account rather than a faulty account. Still the criticisms have led to some interesting variations. For example, very recently William Lyons has proposed a variation in which emotion is seen to be a combination of cognition and physiological change. ;Each of the above views is examined, their subleties drawn out, and their points of agreement and disagreement displayed. But the interest is not simply expository or historical. Rather, the interest is to see what truth, if any, each position contains. The thrust of my examination is that the move from the older "feeling" view to the newer "cognitive" view ignores insights captured by the former. Moreover, the latter's great emphasis on cognition, and even cognition and physiological change is conceptually mistaken. ;Proving these claims is a major concern of this dissertation. Another major concern is to provide a more balanced account of the constituents of emotions. Since the introduction of feeling in the older view is taken to be an insight, the exact nature of feeling is examined. My conclusion is that feeling is constitutive of emotion, having a non-dependent nature. Since it has been argued that cognition and physiological changes are given too much weight in present accounts, their proper place must be shown. My conclusion is that physiological change is not a component in the concept of emotion and that cognition has a place only in certain species of emotion. What does the concept of emotion involve then? I conclude that it is to be explicated in terms of intentionality and feelings, with a place of cognition for certain species of emotion only