A way out of the preface paradox?

Analysis 74 (1):ant091 (2014)
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Abstract

The thesis defended in this article is that by uttering or publishing a great many declarative sentences in assertoric mode, one does not actually assert that their conjunction is true – one rather asserts that the vast majority of these sentences are true. Accordingly, the belief that is expressed thereby is the belief that the vast majority of these sentences are true. In the article, we make this proposal precise, we explain the context-dependency of belief that corresponds to it, we point out why our everyday oral practice of single assertions is not affected by it, and we argue that the proposal leads to a way out of the Paradox of the Preface

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Hannes Leitgeb
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Citations of this work

Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Conjunctive paraconsistency.Franca D’Agostini - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6845-6874.
Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):549-562.
The normative status of logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Modal Logic: An Introduction.Brian F. Chellas - 1980 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
Der Gedanke.Gottlob Frege - 1918 - Beiträge Zur Philosophie des Deutschen Idealismus 2:58-77.
The paradox of the preface.David Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205.

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