A diversidade do novo mecanicismo na ciência cognitiva: uma análise das propostas de Bechtel e Piccinini

Aufklärung 11 (Especial):39-54 (2024)
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Abstract

Prominent authors of new mechanism in cognitive science propose to integrate and unify the field theoretically through the articulation of a mechanistic theory of human cognition. The work of William Bechtel and Gualtiero Piccinini are examples of this proposal. However, an ambitious unification project like this encounters a series of obstacles in cognitive science, traditionally characterized by fragmentation, dispersiveness and theoretical diversity. In this work, I show the substantial differences in the different versions of the theoretical proposals presented on the works of Bechtel and Piccinini. Based on this analysis, I argue that the unification or integration proposals presented by them, based on the mechanistic theory of human cognition, are inadequate, because there is a wide variety of versions of the theory among its own most influential defenders.

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