The Metaphysical Requirement for Models of Prediction and Explanationist Approaches to the Problem of Induction

Axiomathes 27 (3):225-242 (2017)
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Abstract

David Armstrong once argued that to solve the problem of induction with inference to the best explanation we need an anti-Humean conception of law. Some Humeans have argued that this argument begs the question against Humeanism. In this paper, I propose a new argument for the same conclusion which is not vulnerable to this criticism. In particular, I argue that explanationist approaches to the problem of induction that are combined with Humeanism is internally incoherent.

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Counterfactuals.David K. Lewis - 1973 - Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.
Laws and symmetry.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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