Abstract

Some people think there can be no rational dispute concerning values, although there can be, and obviously are, attempts at persuasion. According to this skeptical view people hold differing values and that is the end of the matter. No reason can be given for or against an evaluative attitude. Other people think that value judgments are no different from factual judgments in regard to justification. My view is distinct from each of these extremes. I argue that reasons can be given for various evaluative attitudes, but that these reasons, unlike reasons concerning normal factual matters, are reasons which depend upon some point of view. ;A sentiment is a state of mind which it would be incoherent to be in together with some set of preferences. Simple likings and desires are sentiments. These are to be distinguished from "pure beliefs" which are those beliefs that are coherent with any coherent set of preferences. ;Involved in believing anything is the assumption that one is right or correct on the issue and that anyone who holds a contrary position is wrong. When one believes something, one implicitly holds that there are good justifying reasons supporting one's belief. I claim that this is true also of evaluative attitudes. It is this which distinguishes evaluative attitudes from ordinary wants, likings, and simple preferences. ;An account of justificatory reasons for beliefs can be extended to cover also reasons for sentiments. Reasons generally depend upon a basis of background conditions. The set of pure beliefs among these background conditions in the basis is determined by the objective or subjective orientation of a judgment, but in general is made up of those beliefs which are known to be true. In the case of reasons for sentiments the basis must contain sentiments. These sentiments are determined by the point of view of the judgment. This notion of point of view serves to illuminate the ground of the variety of evaluative attitudes and provides the starting point for an investigation into the roots of disagreement in evaluative matters.