Why Cognitive Sciences Do Not Prove That Free Will Is an Epiphenomenon

Frontiers in Psychology 10 (2019)
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Citations of this work

Three Rationales for a Legal Right to Mental Integrity.Thomas Douglas & Lisa Forsberg - 2021 - In S. Ligthart, D. van Toor, T. Kooijmans, T. Douglas & G. Meynen (eds.), Neurolaw: Advances in Neuroscience, Justice and Security. Palgrave Macmillan.
Consciousness, Causation, and Confusion.Darryl Mathieson - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
The Libet paradigm and a dilemma for epiphenomenalism.Bradford Stockdale - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (8):2244-2261.
Formation of the "Self-Made-Man" Idea in the Context of the Christian Middle Ages.V. Y. Antonova & O. M. Korkh - 2021 - Anthropological Measurements of Philosophical Research 19:117-126.

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