Separating Death from Mind and Morals

Public Affairs Quarterly 3 (3):35-47 (1989)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The definition of death should be framed in biological rather than psychological or moral terms. Loss of personal identity, for example, does not equal death, even if it is a worse fate.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,394

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Why psychological accounts of personal identity can accept a brain death criterion and biological definition of death.David B. Hershenov - 2019 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (5):403-418.
Is Death Irreversible?Nada Gligorov - 2023 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 48 (5):492-503.
Towards a holistic definition of death: the biological, philosophical and social deficiencies of brain stem death criteria.Abigail Maguire - 2019 - The New Bioethics 25 (2):172-184.
Brain death and personal existence: A reply to green and Wikler.Howard Brody - 1983 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 8 (2):187-196.
Analytic Philosophy And Death: Brain Death And Personal Identity.Maurizio Salvi - 1996 - Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics 6 (5):123-124.
The definition of death.Michael J. Wreen - 1987 - Public Affairs Quarterly 1 (4):87-99.
Whole-brain death and integration: realigning the ontological concept with clinical diagnostic tests.Daniel P. Sulmasy - 2019 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 40 (5):455-481.
In Defense of Brain Death: Replies to Don Marquis, Michael Nair-Collins, Doyen Nguyen, and Laura Specker Sullivan.John P. Lizza - 2018 - Diametros 55:68-90.
Death is a Biological Phenomenon.Don Marquis - 2018 - Diametros 55:20-26.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-01-24

Downloads
7 (#1,637,817)

6 months
3 (#1,471,455)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Michael Lavin
Stanford University (PhD)

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references