Abstract

I argue that any concrete event which absolutely precedes a particular effect is causally relevant to the occurrence of it and may be regarded as the cause of it, given a suitable enquirer. First I show how all singular causal statements can be regarded as expressing extensional relations between events, and as explanatory. Then I argue for the main thesis by offering thought experiments and examining attempts to analyse singular causal statements in terms of statements concerning deterministic and probabilistic generalisations, counterfactuals, and general causal statements. One chapter shows that no analysis in terms of strict deterministic laws could pick out a causal relation between concrete events that is narrower than the relation of absolute precedence . Another chapter shows that general causal statements can be analysed in terms of statements of probabilities interpreted as propensities, and that they are somewhat more restricted in the extent of their relativity. Finally I compare the relativity of reasons and causes and argue that any of an agent's reasons for an action can be selected as the reason, or as the explanatory reason, given a suitable enquirer