Abstract

In this paper I would like to deal with a contemporary moral philosopher who, it could be said, expresses a ‘Kantian resonance’. Strictly speaking, my work will be about Christine Korsgaard. More specifically, I want to focus on the specific criticism that Korsgaard addresses to a doctrine such as moral realism, taking into consideration,basically, her celebrated work The sources of normativity. With this purpose, first at all, I will offer a summary of the key ideas that define the philosophical proposal that Korsgaard defends about moral normativity. Second, I will reconstruct the main criticisms that Korsgaard directs against moral realism. Korsgaard, specifically, distinguishes a substantive moral realism from a procedural one. She argues that procedural moral realism is true, while substantive moral realism is not true. However, I will ask myself if, strictly speaking, Korsgaard does not conclude with the admission, also, of a some kind of substantive moral realism.