Review of Kevin O'Regan, Alva Noe “Does functionalism really deal with the phenomenal side of experience?” [Book Review]

Abstract

Sensory Motor Contingencies belong to a functionalistic framework. Functionalism does not give any explanation about why and how objective functional relations should produce phenomenal experience. O’Regan and Noe as well as other functionalists do not propose a new ontology that could support the first person subjective phenomenal side of experience.

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