Regularities, Degrees of Necessity, and Dispositionalism

Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (4):513-524 (2020)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Traditionally, philosophers have cashed out the distinction between law-like and accidental regularities sharply: a regularity is either law-like, and thereby necessary, or accidental. However, Mitchell and Lange have drawn attention to the fact that some law-like regularities come in different degrees of necessity. For instance, the regularity expressed by “all electrons are negatively charged” has a greater degree of necessity than the one expressed by “all mammals are warm-blooded”, even if both of them are true. Moreover, Mitchell argues that the dichotomy between accidental and necessary regularities is unable to capture the complexity of the causal structure of the world. Building on this, I argue that regularities do not only come in different degrees of necessity, but also have different formal features and ontological features. All these features matter in order to make sense of the causal complexity of the world. Accordingly, I propose a new conceptual framework to analyze regularities according to three mutually independent levels of analysis: formal features, degree of necessity, and ontological grounds. This new framework can make sense of different degrees of necessity, and it naturally accommodates a wide variety of scientifically-relevant regularities including those typically associated with laws of nature, biological mechanisms, and dispositional properties.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,449

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Regularities, Laws of Nature, and the Existence of God.John Foster - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101 (1):145-161.
Stable regularities without governing laws?Aldo Filomeno - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 66:186-197.
Dispositional Essentialism in the Context of the Necessity of the Laws of Nature.Ebubekir Muhammed Deniz - 2021 - Kutadgubilig Felsefe-Bilim Araştırmaları Dergisi 44 (2):43-63.
Mechanisms, Laws, and Regularities.Holly K. Andersen - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (2):325-331.
Stability and lawlikeness.Jani Raerinne - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (5):833-851.
Can bare dispositions explain categorical regularities?Tyler Hildebrand - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):569-584.
Divine Lawmaker.John Foster - 2004 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-07-25

Downloads
50 (#457,975)

6 months
12 (#218,371)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Xavi Lanao
Universidad Nacional de Quilmes

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties.Alexander Bird - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.
Science without laws.Ronald N. Giere - 1999 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Laws of nature.Fred I. Dretske - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (2):248-268.

View all 24 references / Add more references