Abstract

In my book, I argue that there is reason to adopt a kind of updated Husserlian approach to perceptual intentionality, viz., based on the idea that perceptual contents are fulfillment conditions. Drawing upon the ideas of the renowned German phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), I bring center-stage the notion of perceptual fulfillment, a kind of non-inferential confirmation, which may take place as part the ongoing perceptual experience. Thus, when looking at a red tomato, I may anticipate that if I turn it around, the back side will also be revealed as red, and this perceptual anticipation may be either fulfilled or disappointed. Since the very presence of the object can be accounted for in terms of such anticipations, instantiating fulfillment conditions, I consider perceptual contents to be fulfillment conditions. I update the Husserlian approach by emphasizing this idea, as well as by using it to engage with various philosophical issues. I justify the project of so updating the view by appeal to the interest and value of being able to bring it to bear on current debates. I justify the updated view by appeal to the fruitful outcomes of these philosophical engagements. In Part 1 of my book, I provide a preparatory overview of Husserl’s 1907 Thing and Space lecture series. In Part 2, I deal with Alva Noë’s enactivism and the various ways in which it proves deficient, and the ways in which I propose to improve it from the Husserlian perspective. In Part 3, I focus on a critique of the rival idea that contents are accuracy conditions, as well as taking up the issue of how to demarcate between what we do and do not perceptually experience, or the issue of determining how rich perceptual experiences are. In Part 4 of the book, I discuss miscellaneous relevant topics.